

TWO *Trade in Amer*
LETTERS

TO A
FRIEND,

ON THE
Present Critical Conjunction of Affairs
IN
NORTH AMERICA;

Particularly on the
Vast Importance of the Victory gained by the NEW-
ENGLAND MILITIA under the Command of Ge-
neral JOHNSTON, at *Lake-George*.

Being the most Genuine ACCOUNT of this ACTION
yet published.

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MDCCLV.

LETTER I.

Shewing wherein the OHIO || the AMERICAN BRITISH
Defeat, is fitted to ad- || Colonies.
vance the Interest of all

LETTER II.

Representing the vast Im- || LAKE-GEORGE to the
portance of the Defeat || AMERICAN BRITISH
of the FRENCH Army at || Colonies.



A
L E T T E R

Relating to the

O H I O D E F E A T .

S I R,

AS you live at a distance from the seat of news, and may know nothing of the Ohio-defeat but from hearsay reports, which, having passed through a variety of hands before they have reached you, must be very uncertain, and mixed with a great deal that is not true, I have been at the pains, for your gratification, to put together, from the best accounts, the whole of what may be depended on for fact, in relation to this interesting affair to all the British American governments: And if I should hereupon add a few thoughts, tending to point out to you wherein this defeat, however inglorious in itself, is yet naturally and powerfully adapted to serve these colonies in the end, it may give some relief to
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your anxious mind, and dispose you to wait, with a becoming submission, the issue of those military operations which are but just begun,

The first news of this defeat was brought us in a letter from Col. Innes, dated July 11th, in these words, " I have this moment received
 " the melancholy news of the defeat of our
 " troops, the General killed and numbers of our
 " officers, our whole artillery taken. In short,
 " the account I have received is so very bad,
 " that, as please God, I intend to make a stand
 " here. 'Tis highly necessary to raise the mili-
 " tia every where to defend the frontiers." It at once appeared to every one from the general air and strain of this letter, that the aged Colonel was under the influence of a strong panic when he wrote it, for which reason we were disposed to hope, that matters were not so bad as he had suggested; and by after contradictory accounts we were encouraged in this hope, till the second of this instant, when, upon the arrival of the western post, it was put beyond all doubt, by a variety of letters, that the Ohio-encounter was, on our side, every way as disadvantageous as we were at first led to conceive it to be.

By comparing the accounts we have hitherto received, it appears, " that the General pro-
 " ceeded from the little meadows with about
 " 1300 men, mostly British, besides the ne-
 " cessary artillery, ammunition, and provisions,
 " leaving the main body of the convoy under
 " the

“ the care of Col. Dunbar, with orders to join
 “ him as soon as possible; that on the 9th of
 “ July the Monongahela was passed first by
 “ 300 men, then by 200, then by the General
 “ himself, with the column of artillery,
 “ baggage, and main body of the army, about
 “ one o'clock; that immediately upon this a
 “ quick and heavy fire was heard from the
 “ front; that the detachments of the 2 and
 “ 300 men gave way, and fell back in great
 “ consternation upon the main body, who were
 “ hastening to sustain them; that this struck
 “ the men with such a panic, and brought on
 “ such confusion as could not, by any expedient
 “ be afterwards remedied; and that in consequence
 “ of this, notwithstanding the courage
 “ and resolution of the officers, the enemy obtained
 “ a complete victory, killing and wounding
 “ a great many *, and obliging the rest to
 “ quit the ground, leaving behind them the
 “ artillery, ammunition, provisions, and whole
 “ baggage.”

The number of the enemy remains still somewhat uncertain. One of the officers writes “ it was impossible by the disposition of
 “ the French and Indians to judge of their
 “ number.” Another is pretty certain, “ that
 “ they did not exceed above 3 or 400.” A

* At the lowest computation, between 6 and 700 soldiers, officers, and private men, were killed, or wounded, besides pioneers, waggoners, servants, &c.

gentleman from Philadelphia of good intelligence says, "by the best accounts they were about 400 Indians and 80 French." I am inclined to think, they were not much more numerous: for if they had, they would probably have cut off the whole army, as they had so great an advantage against them, and fired, not in the European way, but by taking aim, in which method of firing the Canadians, as well as Indians, are very dextrous.

But whether their number was great or small, they made sad havoc of our men. Perhaps, all circumstances considered, history will scarce furnish an instance of such a dreadful carnage. To be sure the like was never before seen in North America: Nor could it have happened, humanly speaking, without great misconduct, either in the officers, or soldiers, or both. Some are pleased to lay the blame on the soldiers; speaking of them as cowards, and as leaving their officers to fall a sacrifice to the enemy. Others seem to think, the chief commander was rather principally faulty in not using due caution, and a prudent forecast, to guard the men against the surprize which involved them in destruction. It does not come within my present design to enter upon an enquiry into the blameable source of this mischief; though you will unavoidably perceive my opinion about it, by reading what I have to offer with respect to the tendency of it finally
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to serve the interest of even all the British American colonies.

I readily own, this defeat, in many respects, is a terrible evil. Great dishonour has been reflected on the British arms;—the Indians will be more strongly attached to the French than ever;—the French are inspired with greater courage and resolution, while, at the same time, their strength is very much increased by the artillery, ammunition, and stores, brought by us within seven miles of their fort, at an immense expence of labour and money: Besides all which, our southern colonies are thrown into perplexity and confusion, and lie doubly exposed to the depredations of the savages of the wilderness.—But these things notwithstanding, it may be best, in the end, we have met with this loss. Shameful and mischievous as it is, it may be one of the grand links in that chain of causes by which heaven may intend to chastise the French, curb their insolence, drive them out of the encroachments they have made on us, and reduce them to a necessity of keeping within their own boundaries, without disturbing us in the possession of ours. These, I would hope, are the beneficial consequences aimed at by providence: Nor, as I imagine, could any thing have happened more naturally and strongly adapted to bring into effect such happy events.

It is too evident to be disputed, that the southern colonies needed something EXTRA-
ORDINARY

ORDINARY to rose them out of that deep security * they were unhappily sunk into. Had they had a just sense of their danger from the French, who were settling and fortifying on their back-lands ; had they in time wisely concerted, and vigorously executed, measures for driving them off, they might easily have done it, and at a comparatively small expence. It was unaccountable inattention to their own safety that brought them into those circumstances, which gave rise to the embarkation of troops from home, and a greater national charge following thereupon than has ever been expended upon the northern colonies, from their first settlement to this day. And the destruction of these troops, in so striking a way, accompanied with such loss and disappointment, is eminently fitted to alarm their fears, awaken in them a sense of danger, and constrain them to speed and vigour, in prosecuting methods, both for guarding themselves, and annoying the French. And should it operate to the production of these good effects, as it naturally

* I very justly speak of them as in deep security ; for though it was the greatest part of a year from the time of Col. Washington's defeat to the arrival of General Braddock in Virginia, yet they had not raised so many as 1000 men to join the troops from England ; which we, in these parts, can attribute to nothing but their being, to an high degree, careless and secure : Especially when we consider, that this is not one fifth part of the men that have been raised in the Massachusetts-Province only, in a much less time, though they were not under the like necessity.

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tends to do, the damage in the end, would be more than counterballanced. For there are more than forty Englishmen in the southern settlements to one Frenchman ; and where the disproportion is so great, they must be capable, under a common blessing, of putting it out of the power of the French to do them any harm, * unless they are madly resolved to continue careless and inactive ; which can't well be supposed after the late occurrence, so powerfully suited to excite in them a becoming concern for the security of their liberties and properties †.

Our

* Pennsylvania only contains more inhabitants than the Province of the Massachusetts. And it would be strange, if that province, with Maryland, Virginia, and the two Carolinas, were not vastly more than a match for the comparatively few French, who are such bad neighbours to them. Had we in New-England, no settlements and fortresses behind superior to those on the back of them, we should esteem ourselves quite safe, not thinking we had any thing to fear from the French, though we had no assistance from Great-Britain.

† One would have thought it could not be supposed, but that the southern colonies, by what has happened among them, should have been excited to an immediate care for their own safety ; but we hear to our very great surprise, that Maryland and Virginia have done nothing as yet ; that Philadelphia is in a wrangle about the method of supplying money ; and that New-York have revoked their vote to raise 400 men, though they had forwarded this vote to the Massachusetts-government: Upon which I would only say, they are in more profound sleep than I imagined ; but I doubt not, they will be thoroughly roused, when they find,

Our fourthern brethren, it must be acknowledged, have not been used to military expeditions. The sooner therefore they are put upon them the better. For their being used to them will, I believe, be found the ONLY STABLE FOUNDATION upon which, under the smiles of heaven, and the well conducted assistance of Great-Britain, they may expect to hold their possessions without molestation from the French. And providence may be opening the way for THIS STABLE FOUNDATION by the present evil event, the rather adapted to this purpose, because so extraordinary in its circumstances. The steps by which it leads hereto are easily discernable, though they may be thought tedious and burdensome. They will, by means of this disaster, be more liable than they ever were before to the incursions of the natives, set on and strengthened by the perfidious French; this will put them under, what I may call, an happy necessity of raising considerable numbers of men to protect their frontiers, and scour the woods; this will inure their men to hardships, and insensibly teach them the art of war, as it ought to be carried on in a wilderness-land: and, in consequence of

find, that the people in their out-settlements are killed, or captivated, or obliged to retire into the heart of their country for safety, as will soon be the case, and the sooner for their present carelessness, and to their far greater cost.

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these things, they will soon have within themselves a power sufficient for their own defence, and capable of being employed offensively too, as there may be occasion.

This is the way in which the northern colonies have had numbers of men, from generation to generation, trained up for war, and inspired with martial courage, disposing them, with all readiness, to go forth against the enemy, whether French, or Indian, or both, as they have been called thereto. And were the southern colonies, in the same way, formed for military exploits, it would be an easy thing, with comparatively little help from home, wisely conducted, to drive the French, not only out of their encroachments, but out of these parts of the earth. And perhaps this may be the view of providence; and the Ohio defeat may be one of the grand steps leading to it, by alarming the English colonies, the southern ones in particular, and putting them upon the acquirement and exercise of martial skill and valor, even from necessity.

This defeat has an obvious tendency also to answer another very good purpose, it may be, the most important of any in order to success in our attempts against the French; and this is the effecting an alteration in some material articles, as they respect the military power that may be employed to this end.

It has been thought necessary, that the chief command should be lodged in a British officer

of known courage, and experience in the art of war as practised in Europe. This gave rise to the appearance of general Braddock in Virginia, as head of all his majesty's forces in North-America. And to this, I believe, it may principally be attributed, that we met with such ill success on the banks of the Monongahela, not that I question the personal valour of this gentleman, or his military skill in the regular way: but he had no idea of the manner of fighting in use here, and therefore wholly neglected the only effectual expedients to guard against the fatal consequences that arose from it. It does not indeed look very likely, that a stranger to the country, and one altogether unacquainted with its warlike methods, which are known to be quite different from what they are in Europe, should be the best qualified person to have the chief hand in planing, and executing the hostile schemes necessary for our protection and security. The present melancholy event is, all circumstances considered, surprisingly calculated to give instruction and warning upon this head: nor, after such dear-bought experience, is it probable we shall again have our first military officer from home. Or should this be still thought necessary, we may reasonably hope, he will be so restrained as not to have it in his power to act, but with the advice of some thoroughly experienced American actually present with him. Had general Braddock been thus restrained, 'tis morally certain, he

he would not have been so shamefully surpris'd and beat. It does not appear that he wanted good advice; and some are of opinion, that if he had hearkned to it, not holding those in too great contempt, who, tho' inferior to him in regular military skill, were yet better acquainted with the methods proper to be us'd with such an enemy as he had to engage with, he might have been alive at this day, and in circumstances to have forced Du Quesne out of the hands of the French.

The American provincial troops, the New-England ones in particular, who have expos'd themselves to hardships and hazards for their king and country, and by their bravery done eminent service for both, may have been too much neglected, I mean in those appointments which are the proper reward of military merit. The regiments upon the establishment order'd to be rais'd this year, in these colonies, were so supplied with British officers, that room was left for only here and there, one of an American descent; and perhaps room would not have been left even for these few, had it not been a necessary expedient in order to the filling up of the regiments. Nor is this the first time, that as brave men as any in the world have been treated with like neglect. 'Tis well-known, New-England gave peace to Europe, not many years ago, by the valour of their men in reducing Cape-Breton; and yet, these very men were strangely overlooked in the appointment

of officers for the two regiments that were raised, even from among themselves, for the securing that important acquisition; that is to say, New-England men did all the service, both in taking and keeping this strong fortress, and one and another from Great-Britain were put into most of the posts of honour and profit, to the exclusion of those who had merited them, and were, without any reflection, as well capable of filling them. A different conduct seems necessary, if any thing is ever intended to be done to good purpose against the French, in these parts of the world. And the late horrid slaughter of British officers, as well as private soldiers, may have a tendency to bring it about. It is certainly adapted to such a purpose. For it is now made manifest, and in a way that cannot fail, one would think, of convincing even all England, that neither British officers, nor private soldiers, without American assistance, can be depended on for success against American enemies.

Had general Braddock been opposed by French regulars only, he would probably have met with little interruption in his progress; but, as he had to do with the Canadians and Indians, who fought in a way he was an entire stranger to, he soon fell a prey into their hands: nor would numbers have served him; they would only have given occasion for a more horrible slaughter of men. The plain truth is, regular troops, in this wilderness-country, are just the same

same that irregular ones would be in Flanders. American irregulars would easily be confounded by regular troops in the open fields of Europe; and regular troops would be as easily reduced to the like confusion by American irregulars in the woods here.

I would not be understood to mean, by what I here say, as tho' we did not need regular troops, or could not make use of them to good purpose. For, as France has sent over a considerable number of their regulars, it is highly proper there should be regulars to oppose them; and, in laying siege to their fortifications, regulars are the fittest to be employed: but, as there is no way of marching to the French fortresses, or to their regulars, either in, or out of them, but thro' the American woods and thickets, the best regular troops that could be sent us would, without all doubt, be attacked in their march; and, should this be the case, they would probably be soon destroyed, or obliged to retreat with loss, not being skilled in the only method of fighting that would be of any real service to them. General Braddock's defeat is a practical instance that must for ever silence all dispute upon this head.

And what is more naturally and obviously deducible herefrom than this, that American irregulars, in an American war, are full as necessary as British regulars? And if American irregulars are thus necessary, it must be evident, at first sight, that it will argue the want
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of policy, if that is done which has a direct tendency to cool their zeal, and damp their spirits; and this most certainly will be done, if they are obliged to see regiments raised upon the British establishment, even among themselves, with so many officers appointed from home, as almost wholly to exclude them from being sharers in any thing that is either honourable or profitable. If one of the good effects following upon the Ohio-defeat, so inglorious to the British arms, as well as hurtful to their interest, is not a greater care to distinguish American merit, it will not be because it is not, in all respects, fitted to point out the political wisdom of such a conduct: nor, unless such a conduct should be consequent thereupon, can it reasonably be expected, that any military attempts will be carried on here with that resolution, vigour, and spirit, which are necessary.

I may pertinently add to what has been hitherto said, it is possible some of the rules and articles for the further governing his majesty's forces, given out the last year, extending to America, and the troops serving here by commission only from the governors of the several provinces, would not have run exactly in their present form, if the importance of these troops in an American war had been so thoroughly considered then, as it probably will be now. Perhaps, upon this supposition, it would not have been thought absolutely necessary to be

so explicit in saying, " that the general or field-officers of the provincial troops shall have no rank with the general and field-officers who serve by commission from us ;" or, that " the captain and other inferior officers of the British forces shall, in all duties, take post of the provincial officers of the like rank, though their commissions should be of elder date." Such a distinction, so formally made between British and provincial officers, however just in itself, may, in present circumstances, be of great disservice, and certainly will, should it unhappily prove an occasion of jealousy, disaffection, and contempt, in these officers towards each other.

The subjection also of the provincial troops to courts-martial, " in like manner with the officers and soldiers of the British troops, when acting in conjunction with them," may probably tend to render the enlistment of soldiers a much greater difficulty, than if they were left to be tried conformably to the laws of the provinces to which they belong. For it is to be considered, nine in ten of the men, who must compose our provincial troops, in any important expedition, if to be depended on, are such as go upon principle, from loyalty to their king, love to their country, and a just concern for the welfare of their families, and the security of their liberties and estates ; and these are the men that would be most startled at the thought of being subjected to martial-law, as practised at home ; nor would they easily

easily be persuaded to come under such subjection.

The unhappy event that has lately taken place in America is well fitted to convey to the mother-country just ideas of what is proper to be done here; and it will, accordingly, as we may reasonably trust, be productive of those determinations, which shall, in the best manner, tend to support the honour of the provincial, as well as British troops, and give them all the weight and encouragement that can be desired.

You are satisfied, I believe, by this time, that the Ohio-defeat is naturally adapted to serve the American-English colonies in the end, however grievous it may be for the present: though I should not do justice to New-England in general, and the Massachusetts-province in particular, if I did not suggest my fears, lest, by means of this disappointment, they would be subjected to one very great hardship, unless his majesty, in his paternal wisdom and goodness, should do that which will, in a good measure, prevent its being so. To explain myself here.

New-England in general, and the Massachusetts-province in particular, are the chief, I may say, the only sources that may be relied on for a supply of effective men, to carry into execution any future designs against the French. There are no men in the American colonies so well qualified, or spirited as these, to engage
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in warlike enterprizes: and this is so well known, that the other colonies, as well as Great-Britain, have their expectations mainly from us. The danger therefore is, lest our men should be called into military service beyond our ability, as well as proportion. This indeed is the case at present. The Massachusetts-government only has more men employed in the several expeditions now on foot, than all the other colonies put together. One full eighth part of our people (the flower of them too) are in active service at this day, and a greater number of them in our own pay than when we undertook the reduction of Louisbourg. Such, in truth, is the spirit reigning in the province, that every third man, I believe, would be in readiness, upon very short warning, to engage in an enterprize I could name, if put upon it, and duly encouraged in it. It is therefore obvious, at first sight, that, in the present situation of affairs, we shall be singularly liable to have our men taken off from their labour, in their respective callings, the effect whereof will be the rise of all the necessaries of life; an incapacity to pay those taxes, which are already tripled upon us; and, what is still worse, the stopping our growth for twenty or thirty years, by the loss of our young men, either by death, or their going where they will be exposed to fewer hardships, and less charge.

It is in the power of his Majesty to prevent, in a great measure, these inconveniencies. I don't

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mean by not calling upon us for our men ; (this, considering the present temper and character of the southern colonies, may be necessary) but by employing them at the charge of the crown ; at the same time, making us the special object of his paternal regards, in proportion to our greater zeal and activity in the defence of our Sovereign's rights against the French encroachments.

It does not seem equitable, that this province, because more loyal and active than the other provinces, should be drained of its men, and burdened with a weight of charge beyond what we are able to bear. We may, I think, reasonably expect all proper care will be taken to guard against this : nor otherwise will it be long in our power to be of any service, either to his Majesty, or the other colonies under his dominion. We shall sink under the burden that is laid upon us, and unavoidably fall into ruin.

I cannot help observing here, though this province has been the grand barrier to all the American colonies for more than an hundred years, and has, in that time, expended immense sums of money, in the wars it has carried on with the French, and Indians, for the common good, as well as its own ; yet it has never received the least help, in respect either of men, or money, from any of the southern governments : nor has the mother-country, in all that time, made them a donation of so much as one thousand pounds, so far as I remember, to assist
them

them in their own proper defence: which we take the more hardly, as we have been publickly told, that no less a sum than ten thousand pounds sterl. was given the last year to Virginia, (and without their asking for it) to encourage them in their attempts against the French at Ohio; while yet, this is the first time they have been called to any difficulty of this sort, or put to any charge worth mentioning. Were we, in this province, to meet with proportionable encouragement from home, we should not think much of any thing we might be called to for the common benefit of the American British colonies.

I believe, Sir, you think it high time I should come to a close of this letter; but I must beg your patience, though I may already have trespassed upon it, while I mention to you what our New-England forces have done this summer for the service of his majesty, and turning the scale in favour of the English, notwithstanding our loss at Ohio.

Let me then congratulate you upon the reduction of the French forts * at Nova-Scotia.

* One of these forts was much stronger in its make than Du Quesne, and defended with more and heavier cannon; and our troops, while bombarding it, and at work in preparing to cannonade it, were attacked, from the woods, by perhaps as great a number of Indians, surprized and defeated our army at the southward. And what was the effect? Our New-England men, instead of being affrighten'd by the Indian's yelling, and standing as marks to be shot at,

tia. In some complimentary addresses to the governor of Hallifax, New-England was kept so intirely out of view, that a stranger would have guessed, that British troops only had merited the honour of this exploit: whereas the plain truth is, it was done by two regiments (of a thousand each) sent from New-England, with the assistance of only two or three hundred of his Majesty's regular troops. This could not well have been disguised, even in a compliment, if a New-England officer had had the chief command, as we were universally led to expect. How the matter came to be otherwise ordered, I presume not to say: but thus much is certain, the honour of New-England was not thereby advanced, nor the most likely step taken to promote his Majesty's service in future enlistments. I have no view in what I now say to suggest the least reflection on Col. Monckton; for, by all accounts, he is every way equal to the place he holds, and has behaved excellently well in it: but it must be thought reasonable, that New-England should have had the honour of a chief commander from among her own sons; especially as it is known here, that they enlisted upon this supposition, and would have been persuaded upon no other.

I need not observe to you the importance of these acquisitions in Nova-Scotia. They are alone while they could do them little or no hurt, took them in their own way, bravely followed them into the woods, and soon obliged them to retreat, without ever attempting again to give them the least disturbance.

alone a full counter-balance to our loss at the southward; and you will easily be disposed to think so, when I have told you, that the Neutral-French, as they are called, are, by this means, intirely subjected to our command. And accordingly transport-vessels, (they having refused to swear allegiance to his Majesty George our gracious Sovereign) have been taken up, and sailed from hence, to carry them out of that part of America, and to place them in others where they may be less dangerous and troublesome. I suppose, by this time, Nova-Scotia is emptied of its French inhabitants, and thereby secured to the British crown more effectually than ever. How galling must this be to France! What a vast disappointment! when she doubtless expected the reverse of all this, as she had sent over so great a number of troops, and with a design to accomplish that on her side, which we have done on our's.

We thankfully ascribe it, under the smiles of providence, to the seasonable arrival of Admiral Boscawen, with so powerful a naval force, that the Gallic scheme, so far as it related to Nova-Scotia, has been intirely defeated. And such has been the vigilant and prudent conduct of this brave commander, and such the distresses arising herefrom to a certain place, that it might, perhaps, should permission be granted, be soon put into *English* hands, to the intire ruin of the French interest in America.

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I don't think I shall be too hasty, if I congratulate you also on the virtual or constructive conquest even of Du Quesne itself on the Ohio, in what Major-General Shirley, our governor, has already done to cut off the communication between Canada and that fort. I own, I was not without pain, when I knew his excellency was going in person upon the Niagara expedition, and with no more than about 2500 men, as it might reasonably be expected the French would be alarmed at an attempt to take from them the grand key to all the lakes, and whole country extending to the Mississippi; and my fears were heightened upon the advantage General Braddock's defeat would give them, the more powerfully to oppose him. But, by the wise and timely care of his excellency, the English Oswego-fort, upon the margin of the south-east part of lake Ontario, was so enlarged and strengthened as to discourage a thousand French and Indians from making an attack upon it, though they were collected together, near the fort, for this purpose;—besides which, he has for some time had, through the laborious diligence of a number of New-England carpenters, well guarded and defended while at their work, three well arm'd vessels cruizing in the lake; and by this time two more are built, and join'd with them; which make a very formidable squadron for a small sea, as Ontario may be called, though detached from the ocean between 2 and 300 miles at the nearest distance.

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And, by means of this squadron, he has it in his power to prevent an attempt against Oswego by canonading or bombarding, without which it will be an easy thing to hold it against any number of French and Indians that can be brought to take it. And by this squadron also he has rendered it impracticable (as may be seen by only looking on a map of this part of America) for the Canadians to convey artillery, ammunition, or any other stores, for the defence of their encroachments on the back of our southern colonies. Fort Du Quesne must, for this reason, soon fall into our hands; and without much trouble, besides what may be called for in watching the lake.

Had General Braddock made it his first business to secure the command of lake Ontario, which he might easily have done soon enough to have stopt the force that was sent from Canada to Du Quesne, that fort must have been surrendered to him upon demand; and had he gone this way to it, greater part of that vast sum might have been saved to the nation, which was expended in making a waggon road, thro' the woods and mountains, the way he went. Why he went this way I presume not to enquire; much less would I say, that he was above thinking, any plan of operation could be better than his own.

It is impossible to determine at this distance, whether his excellency General Shirley will directly endeavour the reduction of Niagara-fort.

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He is wise, and cautious; and will, I believe, do nothing upon this head, under present circumstances, unless there is the utmost probability of success. It would not give me any concern, if he should make no immediate attempt upon this fort. For as he has now got the command of lake Ontario, the grand point is gained. The key of communication is in English hands; and if a good use is made of it, the consequence must be the intire destruction of the French interest on the back-parts of our southern colonies, in a little time, and with little pains.

As to our Crown-Point expedition, its effect is still altogether in the womb of providence; though it might have been determined long ago, and in our favour, humanly speaking, had not a delay been rendered unavoidable, by the obligation which was laid upon governor Shirley to go to Maryland (a curious specimen, among other things we have seen, of the signal advantage of the lately proposed union of the provinces) to settle with General Braddock the plan of action for the summer. This affair has now been so long in hand, and so much opportunity hereby given the Canadians to employ even their whole power to oppose us, that I am not, I freely own, without fear what may be the consequence. The troops from France, not intercepted by Admiral Boscawen, may, before this time, be posted in the most advantageous situation for the defence of that place: and

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should this be the case, our New-England men may be called to difficult service. If they don't succeed, it will not be for want of courage and resolution. Superior force may possibly oblige them to return without accomplishing what they went for; but I rather hope soon to hear, that they are in possession of Fort-Frederick.

I have nothing further to add at present, but that I am, without a compliment,

Your very good friend

Boston, Aug: and humble servant,
25, 1755.

T. W.

P. S. You will probably gratify some private friends, by giving them the opportunity of perusing this letter. You may act your pleasure upon the matter: nay, I object not against your making the letter public, if you should think it fitted to promote the public service.

T. W.

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L E T T E R
T O A
F R I E N D,

Relating to the Defeat of the French and
Indians at Lake-George.

S I R,

IN my letter to you, relating to the Ohio defeat, I took a brief notice of our Crown-point expedition; discovering some uneasiness at its having been so long delayed. I am now well pleased with that delay; as it has given occasion to the greatest action, in its kind, that ever happened in North-America. Never was such a battle fought here before!—Never had we opportunity before of gaining so glorious a conquest over so great an army!— I gave it also as my opinion, “That the New-England troops, by reason of this delay, would have the whole power of Canada to contend with;” in which I happened to make a right judgment. For, the day you published my letter, an express arrived from general Johnson, advising,

“ That the spies he had sent out were returned,
 “ and brought him intelligence, that all Cana-
 “ da was in motion, the roads filled with
 “ waggons, transporting all manner of stores
 “ to Crown-point, and numbers of men con-
 “ tinually going there to reinforce Fort-Frede-
 “ rick:” Upon which the general went on to
 say, “ That a large reinforcement was, in this
 “ situation of affairs, absolutely necessary on
 “ our side;” recommending it to the several
 New-England colonies “ to be as speedy in
 “ making it as might be;” and assuring them,
 “ That, in the mean time, instead of being
 “ idle, he would employ his men in building
 “ a fort at the entrance upon the carrying-
 “ place towards Lake George, or, as the
 “ French call it, Lake Sacrament, and after
 “ that, clear a road thro’ the carrying-place to
 “ the head of the Lake, and build another
 “ fort at that important pass, by which time
 “ he hoped the reinforcements would be
 “ raised and sent, enabling him to proceed on
 “ his design.” It was while our general was
 at this pass, and before he had built the second
 fort, or received any reinforcements, that he
 was attacked by the French and Indians.

You have probably seen his letters to the go-
 vernours of the several colonies concerned in
 the Crown-point expedition; giving an account
 of his engagement with, and the success against
 the enemy: for it was printed the very day it
 came to hand, that every one might be ac-
 quainted

quainted with its contents. And if you have seen this letter, you must be pleased with it, and conceive an high opinion of the general's merit. Perhaps, the best bred regular could not have disposed matters, under like circumstances, with greater wisdom.--- And the vein of modesty that runs thro' his whole narrative cannot but recommend him to all who are capable of discernment.--- But as his letter was wrote so soon after the action, it was impossible the account of things should be particular enough to satisfy the curiously inquisitive.

I shall therefore give you a summary abstract of what we have more lately received, that may be depended on for fact; from whence you will easily be let into a clear and just idea of this whole matter. And, as you will probably expect it from me, I shall hereupon add a few thoughts tending to set the importance of this conquest in a proper light before you; not forgetting, before I finish, to acquaint you with the reinforcements the New-England colonies have raised and sent, to guard against a disappointment as to the present expedition: Upon which you will be at no loss to determine, that the burden laid upon the New-England colonies, is, in point of charge, far beyond what they are able to bear, if Great-Britain does not interpose for our help.

I have been at the pains to consider and compare a number of letters, which have been sent from the army, especially from the officers
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in it, and those among them whose characters I am acquainted with; I have likewise had personal conversation with a gentleman of distinction, who, a full week after the action was over, was sent an express by the general to this town; and with another also who came away about the same time: and the sum of what I have collected, I shall relate to you under three divisions, answerable to the three engagements our men had with the enemy.

On the 7th of this instant, a number of Mohawks, who had been out as scouts, returned, and informed the general, that they had found three large roads from the south-bay, which they were satisfied could not be made but by the marching of so many considerable bodies of men, who were probably gone to attack our fort at the carrying-place. The general, upon this, dispatched two expresses * that evening to col. Blanchard, the commanding officer there, the latter of which returned about twelve o'clock with this account, "that they had both heard and seen the enemy, and that they were about four miles from the fort." A council of war having been called the next morning, the result was that a thousand men should be detached from the army under the command of col. Williams, with two hundred

* Mr. Adams, the first express, was killed by the enemy in going to the fort; and general Johnson's letter sent by him to col. Blanchard was found in the aid de camp's pocket.

Indians under the command of Hendrick the Mohawk sachem, and sent to annoy the enemy, whether at the fort, or in their retreat from it, either as victorious, or defeated. This was accordingly done, without any loss of time; and it made way for, what I call, the first engagement. For this detachment had not marched above two miles and an half, before they unexpectedly found themselves within reach of the enemy. They were first discovered by an advanced party of Indians, with Hendrick at their head; who immediately fired upon them. This gave the alarm to col. Williams, who endeavoured with a number of men to secure a rocky eminence hard by, from whence, as from a kind of castle, he might annoy the enemy. But, as they had intelligence of his march, by a scout they had sent out, they had secured it before, lay there in ambuscade, and upon his approach within sure reach of their guns, they rose up, fired, and killed him, and many more, dead on the spot. By this time the fight became very fierce on both sides. The advanced party of Indians behaved with the utmost intrepidity; but perceiving they should be surrounded, and destroyed, they gave way; and as they passed by our men, they told them of their danger, and advised to a retreat. They went on notwithstanding, fighting with undaunted courage and resolution; but finding themselves over-powered with numbers, and almost encircled, they quitted the ground, firing
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as they gave back with constancy and fury. Five or six hundred of them retreated with such dexterity, and vigorous exertment, that the return of this detachment to the camp was hereby rendered, in a manner, safe and easy. The French general owned, that we killed more of his men in this fight, than we lost of our own. And my informer assures me, this acknowledgement of his was agreeable to the truth of fact. For he saw himself, the next day, and counted, upwards of one hundred and forty dead bodies in the place where the fight first began ; tho' he could not tell the precise number that were French, because they had been stripped by the Indians, and lay naked. And besides this heap, as it were, of dead bodies, he tells me they were scattered more or less the whole way between the place where the engagement began, and the camp. He further gave me to understand, that he took out his watch, when the fire was first heard at the camp ; that he penciled the time ; that it was precisely eleven o'clock wanting five minutes ; and that the retreat was not finished till half an hour after twelve ; so that this retreat, and the fight previous to it, continued one hour and thirty-five minutes ; from whence it appears, that our men were not over-hasty in getting out of the way of danger : For they were distant from the camp no more than two miles and an half,

half *. To me it seems very wonderful, considering the superiority of the enemy in number, and their coming upon our men unawares, that they were not intirely routed.

Some have found fault with this detachment; supposing that they should rather have been cut to pieces, than have turned their backs upon the enemy. But they herein talk wildly. A good retreat is the next glory to a victory. When troops are over-powered with numbers, and unawares too, the truest courage is discovered in devising and executing the best methods to come off with as little loss as may be. Had our men been upon equal terms with the enemy, I should have thought they had acted unworthy of the name of New-England men, if they had given way upon any consideration whatever. But they had now to contend, not only with a large body of regular veterans, but with irregular troops more numerous than themselves. And, under these circumstances, what would bravery, conducted by wisdom, direct to, but to make as good a retreat as they could. They might have stood, 'tis true, till they had all been killed; but, in that case, they would have justly me-

* General Johnson, judging of the distance by the fire, says, it was three or four miles; but my informer assures me, he was present with the surveyor, when the distance between the fort at the carrying-place, and camp, was accurately measured with a chain; that it was thirteen miles; and that the distance of the place where this fight began from the camp, was no more than two miles and a half at farthest.

rited the character of mad-men. Tis probable, I own, this retreat (at least in regard of number) might be attended with surprize, disorder and confusion: and it must otherwise have been miraculous, as many of our young men were here, who never before heard a gun fired in anger. Besides, there was not so much as one regular in our whole army either among the officers, or private men.----And further, they were now engaged, not with regulars only, but with Canadians and Indians, the manner of whose fighting is irregular and confused.--- The wonder to me is, not that they retreated, or that numbers of them might be disordered in their retreat; but that they should be able upon the whole, to make so good a retreat; annoying the enemy all the while they were retreating, and yet managing their retreat so as to come off with comparatively so small a loss. Col. Williams, major Ashley, capt. Ingersol, capt. Porter, capt. Fernal, capt. Stoddert, capt. M'Gin, capt. Stevens; lieuts. Burt and Pumroy, fell in this engagement, with a considerable number of our private men. Hendrick, the noted Mohawk Sachem, fell likewise, with a number of Indians.

It may properly enough be observed here;-- when the Mohawks found their great Sachem dead and scalped, they were exceedingly enraged; surrounding the tent where the French general lay, and insisting that he should be delivered into their hands, that they might scalp him

him also. It was with great difficulty he was saved from falling a sacrifice to their fury. Our officers were obliged to remove him from tent to tent to keep him concealed from them, and finally found it necessary, notwithstanding the badness of his wounds, to transport him privately to Albany; where he now is in a dangerous condition, if on this side the grave. The French have not behaved thus humanely and kindly towards English prisoners. When they hear of this and other civilities towards their general, and the other captives with him, it will, I hope, make them ashamed of their past conduct, and teach them to treat our people in a more humane way, should any fall into their and the Indian's hands, while united in any action.

It was not long after the return of this detachment to the camp, before the enemy appeared in sight, and found our men in readiness to give them a warm reception. This was owing to the notice they had of their approaching towards them, and the gradual manner of it, occasioned by the above fight and retreat. It might have been of dangerous consequence, had they suddenly made an attack upon our camp; but as we had this warning, opportunity was happily given us to throw up a breast-work of trees (as general Johnson calls it;) to plant a number of cannon in suitable places about it; to take possession of some eminences on our left flank, under the guard of a field-piece advantageously situated;

to line our breast-work throughout with men; and, in short, to put things in the best disposition, time and circumstances would permit, to defend ourselves, and destroy the enemy. And now came on the second battle; perhaps, the most furious and resolute, on both sides, that ever was fought in North-America. It opened between 11 and 12 o'clock (keeping to the general's account) with the fire of the French regulars; but in a few minutes, the fire became general, and nothing was heard but the noise of guns. This part of the attack was mostly made upon our left wing, bearing towards the center; and it was principally sustained by the Connecticut troops, who behaved with great activity and valour. When the French found, upon a long and obstinate trial, that they must be destroyed if they continued here, they moved to the right of our camp, where the Massachusetts regiments were posted; and upon this attack also, they maintained a brisk and resolute fire for a long time, but were so weakened by the warm and dextrous opposition they met with, that their fire gradually grew feeble, and with observable intermissions; upon which, our brave men, together with the Indians, jumped over the breast-work, resolutely fell upon them hatchet in hand, drove them off the ground, pursued after them, slew a great many, and took about thirty prisoners, among whom was Baron de Dieskau,

Dieskau, the general of all the troops lately come to Canada from France.

This engagement, with the pursuit, lasted about 7 hours. Our loss was less now than in the former fight; but the loss on the side of the French was greater: according to the best accounts, we killed, in this battle, 3 or 4 hundred of their men, officers and private soldiers.

When general Johnson's letter first came to town, we were ready to think, the French must have lost at least a thousand men; as the battle was of such long continuance, and we had the advantage of cannon, and a breast-work of trees to defend ourselves. Our idea also of the bravery of the French was, by reason of this advantage, very much enlarged; and it seemed nothing extraordinary that our army, under the above circumstances, should get the better of them. But, from major Hore, who came to this government last week upon an errand from the army, is one of its officers, and was excellently active in the late fight; as also from another gentleman who came since, we were led to conceive more justly of the matter. Our wonder now was, not that 1000 were not killed, but that so many as 3 or 400 should be slain in this battle. For their account is, " that the battle was fought upon a plain, covered with pitch-pine trees, of various sizes, some smaller, some greater, as is common in such plains, in their natural

natural state of wildness, and a thick undergrowth of shrubs, intermixed with brakes, as high as a man's waste; that no part of this plain was cleared, except only the road we had made from the fort at the carrying-place to the camp; that the French regulars marched in this road, and began the fight drawn up in order; that they kept their order but a small space of time, not long enough to receive a second discharge from our cannon; and that the battle was now carried on in the Indian way by the whole French army, regulars as well as irregulars, some fighting behind trees, and stumps, and others squatting so as to be defended by the under-growth of shrubs and brakes." 'Tis easy, upon this representation of the matter, to see, that the enemy were upon equal terms with us, tho' we had a kind of breast-work; nay, as it was nothing more (so I am informed by one that was present when it was made) than bodies of trees laid singly upon the ground, round the camp, and in many places so as not to touch one another, I am ready to think, they had the advantage of us; especially as the under-growth near the camp had before been cut down for the conveniency of the army. And from hence also it will not appear strange, if our cannon (three or four of which were the only ones that could be used, and these not more than 3 or 4 rounds, it being to little purpose to fire them) did not do them the damage, we, upon the first hear-
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ing of the story, might be apt to imagine. The plain truth is, after the regulars became irregulars in the manner of their fighting, there was no great slaughter made, either by our cannon, or random musquetry. The chief execution was now done, partly by our men's watching for opportunities to fire, when they could catch any of the French or Indians within full view; for they are most of them so dextrous in the use of the gun, as to be pretty sure of taking a man down within an hundred yards distance: and partly, by their rushing upon them, towards the close of the battle, and pursuing them, not only with their guns, but hatchets* also.

Our men, after they had entered on action, were least fearful of any ill consequence from the regulars; and they suffered least from them: tho' none among the enemy suffered so much from us as these regulars, thro' their unacquaintedness with the American method of fighting. Few of them, comparatively, whether officers, or private men, are thought to have escaped with their lives. How else

* Perhaps the hatchet (a weapon our men were all armed with) is, in our way of fighting, a more fatal instrument than even the broad sword, or bayonet, if managed with skill. The Indians will readily fasten it in a man's skull, at more than a rod's distance. Many of our people are equally dextrous in the throw of it; and all our men know its use so well, that 'tis certain death to a man to be within fair reach of their arm, when stretched forth to strike with it.

can it be accounted for, that the general should be taken alone? So I was particularly informed he was, by major Hore, whose account of this fact is confirmed by several letters from the army, particularly by one from general Lyman. 'Tis scarce credible, that the chief commanding officer, and one of such importance to the French interest, should be left by all his regulars, both officers and common soldiers, and in a wounded condition too, if they were generally alive. One would think, they must, for shame, have kept with him at all hazards. Thus much, I think, must be allowed to be certain; either that they were generally slain, or struck with such a panic, upon being pursued by our men, as to be out of the possession of themselves.

General Johnson and major Nichols were wounded in this engagement; and they only among the field-officers. The general received a ball in his thigh; but he can now walk about, and we hope will be able to proceed in person in further prosecution of our design, when the reinforcements are arrived. Col. Titcomb was the only officer, at least above a captain, that fell in this second battle. He was shot dead on the spot. And his fall is the more to be regretted, as he was well experienced in the method of battering forts. He had a principal hand in the erection of all the batteries at Louisbourg, and commanded one at that siege, which was known by his name,

name, and was eminently galling to the enemy. He went then, and now also, chiefly for the publick benefit; and his name ought to be transmitted to posterity with honour.

One thing more may be worthy of notice with reference to this battle; and that is, that among the 2 or 300 arms that have already been brought into the camp, a number appear to have been those that were taken from us at the Ohio-defeat: from whence it is obvious to collect, that some of the Indians, or Canadians, or both, that came off conquerors at the Monongahela, were slain at Lake-George. —This was the fate particularly of monsieur St. Pierre, whose death is perhaps the greatest loss the French could have met with, at this day; as he was the chief commander of the Indians, and had most influence to engage them in any design against the English.

The third engagement, as I may properly call it, was occasioned thus. —Col. Blanchard, the chief officer at the carrying-place, not knowing but they might need help at the camp, detached to their assistance between 2 and 300 men, mostly New-Hampshire, some Yorkers, under the command of captain M^c Ginnis. Between 4 and 5 o'clock, they reached the place where col. Williams had been attacked in the morning, and there they found about 500 of the enemy (chiefly Indians) who had fled from the former battle, and were come hither to refresh themselves,

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scalp our dead, take their packs, and get off. Our men fell upon them with the greatest fury, made prisoners of some, killed a great many, and intirely routed them; driving them off the ground, and recovering more of their packs than they could carry with them to the camp.† It can scarce be accounted for, that they should be able to accomplish all this, upon any other supposition than that of the enemy's being dispirited with the dressing they had received a little before, and multiplying, in their fright, the numbers with which they were now beset. We lost but a few men in this fight. General Johnson says, two were killed, eleven wounded, and five missing. Among the wounded is captain M^cGinnis, who behaved with prudence and valour. He is since dead of his wounds. The slaughter of the enemy was very considerable. The account we have received is, that we slew near an hundred of them: thus ended the memorable 8th day of this instant September.

Our loss, upon the whole, amounts to 187 English; 126 killed, and 61 missing: tho',

† This engagement was begun near the place, where the French had encamped the night before, and where they had left their baggage. Accordingly being thus driven off, our people the next day brought in four or five waggon loads of ammunition, provisions, blankets, &c. And they since find, that their flight was so hasty, and so much in a fright, that, as they fled, they dropt their blankets, bread, and even some of the scalps of our men.

of the missing, 20 are returned, and probably more by this time. I can't learn, that the Indians lost more than from fifteen to twenty. The wounded are ninety-four English, and about ten or twelve Indians. The Massachusetts-regiments are the greatest sufferers, as they were most in action. Two of their three Colonels were killed, one of their majors [another was wounded], besides several of their Captains and Lieutenants; and among them are the greater part of the private men that were slain. The loss on the enemy's side was much greater than on ours. We know not the number of the wounded; but between five and six hundred were probably slain in all the engagements, and it may be yet more; for our people are daily finding dead bodies. The account from New-York and Albany, is 700: But the precise number of the slain will never be known. The Indians, we are all sensible, are strangely solicitous to hide their dead, and will run all hazards to this end. And they have doubtless concealed numbers of their killed men. We are satisfied of this, not only from their known temper and practice, but from our having found at least forty biers, [poles with cross-sticks of wood, hastily put together] besmeared with blood, upon which, it is supposed, they carried off numbers of their slain. Our people have also found some of their concealed dead, particularly four or five Indians in a sunk piece of land.

I may properly take notice here of, what I esteem an excess of civility in our people towards the French.——They sent out parties, as soon as they could with conveniency, not only to bury their dead, but to bury as many of them as might be without the knowledge of the Indians, to prevent their being scalped. This I call an excess of civility, not indeed considered in itself simply, but comparing it with the conduct of the French towards us. They took no care to save any of our men, who fell at the southward, this summer, from being scalped; but suffered them all, officers as well as common soldiers, to have this indignity offered to them by the Indians: And moreover, they left their dead bodies upon the field of battle, as we have been well assured, to putrify and rot there, unless they were devoured by the wolves and crows, and other beasts and birds of prey. Considering this inhuman conduct of the French, I can't but think, we exceeded in our civilities to the dead at Lake-George. For we have learned by long experience, that unless we treat them as they treat us, we may expect ill usage at their hands.

As to the number of the French and Indians engaged in this battle, it remains still uncertain. In the New-York news-paper, that came to town last post, they are said to have been 3376. The account stands thus. Regulars, 1126. Militia, 1200, formed in 12 companies, with

20 regulars in each company. Indian Traders, 300. Militia officers volunteers, 30. Cadets, about 20. Indians 700. Total, 3376. 'Tis evident, I believe, from General Dieskau's papers, that he brought this number with him from Canada, thus particularly ascertained: But whether he left any at Crown-point, or Ticonderogo, and if any, how many, cannot perhaps be reduced to a certainty. Thus much we may venture to say, as he knew our force, it is highly probable, he came with one that was superior. I cannot therefore suppose, he had less than 2000 Canadians and Indians, besides 5 or 600 regulars at least. We had about 2100 New-England men, and between 2 and 300 Indians. The rest of our men were partly confined by sickness, but mostly left at the Carrying-place to take care of the fort there.

Having thus given you as particular an account, as you can reasonably expect, at present, of this victory over the French and Indians, I can't, in consistency with the regard I have for my country, restrain myself from going on to represent, in a few words, the IMPORTANCE of it to the British interest.

You will at once be sensible of its great Importance, if you only turn the tables in your mind, and suppose the French had been victors, instead of our army.

Some, by giving a loose to their imaginations, have strangely heightened our melancholy condition,

dition, in this view of the matter. They have, in their fancies, blocked up all communication with our Troops at Lake Ontario, and delivered our Governor, who is now there, a prey into French hands ;——they have looked upon Albany as besieged, and taken ;——yea, they have transported the enemy to New-York, and entertained fearful apprehensions respecting the fate even of that city. —— But these are vain imaginations, the imagery of mere fancy ; and must appear so to all, who will only call to mind, what was done at Albany, Connecticut, and the western parts of this government, when it was known, that our army was attacked, but unknown what would be the issue. We have been well assured, they were beating to arms, and would have been upon the enemy, with treble their number, in a fortnight's time, had not tidings of our being conquerors rendered their immediate progress needless.

But though these fancied consequences would not have taken place, had the French come off victorious ; yet others, and very mischievous ones too, must have followed. Our fort at the carrying place would certainly have fallen into their hands, and together therewith all the artillery, ammunition, and stores, which had not been taken by them at the camp—awful numbers of our men must have been slain, and captivated ; and, in a word, our whole army routed, and an entire end put to our design against Crown-point, at least for this year :—all which
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has been happily prevented, by its being ordered by providence, that the victory should fall on our side.

The positive advantages of this conquest are also very signal, and may be worthy of particular notice.

Hereby the disgrace that was reflected on the British arms, on the banks of the Monongahela, is wholly wiped away. Were 300 of the English slain there? A much greater number of French and Indians (5 or 600) were slain here. --- Were the English regulars struck with a panic, when attacked there by French and Indian irregulars? The French regulars, and veterans also, were seized with an equal fright here, when pursued by New-England irregulars: otherwise they would not have fled so universally, and in such hurry, as to leave their first officer alone, not having a single man to help him. -- Was the British General mortally wounded in that engagement? So was the French General in this (he is supposed to be dead of his wounds, before this time;) only the advantage lies on our side; for our General was carried off by his own men, whereas the French General was left to fall a prisoner into his enemies hands.

Hereby an happy turn has been given to the spirits of our men on the one hand; and an unhappy one to the enemy's on the other. Our people, to an observing eye, were plainly under a depressure, occasioned by the horrid slaughter at the southward, the like whereto had never before been seen, or heard of, in the country ;
while

while on the other hand, the French and Indians were flushed with the victory they had obtained, and disposed therefrom to undertake any thing, imagining there would be no standing before them: But by what was done at Lake George, this state of mind has luckily been inverted. We are now raised in our spirits; they sunk in theirs: — We go on, in our design animated with new life and vigour; they oppose us discouraged and intimidated: — We act against them as conquerors; they against us as having been fairly beat from the field of battle, and quite routed.

In fine, hereby the strength of the enemy has been greatly weakened. They have lost their General, an experienced warrior, who was purposely sent from France to be at the head of their military affairs; and they have lost also, together with him, most of their officers of distinction and worth, and a great number of their common soldiers. It is true, 2 or 3 of our chief officers, and 10 or 12 inferior ones, all men of bravery, were slain in the same field of battle, as well as a considerable number of our private men: but the loss on their side, with respect to officers as well as common soldiers, is far greater than on ours. Their prisoners say, their army is ruined. And, perhaps, after a deduction of their dead, their wounded, their captivated, their deserters, their lost and perished in the woods, their number (fitted for action) will not be more than half what it was, when they came forth against us. This is certainly
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a great advantage to us, and an equal disadvantage to them. They will doubtless, be reinforced from Canada ; but so will our army from New-England : And Canada, we know, can't supply such numbers of men, as it is in the power of New-England to do. And, by reason of this effort of the French, in which they were entirely disappointed, we are better able to judge, what reinforcements may be necessary, and are more warmly spirited to raise and send them with the quickest dispatch.

And this minds me of my promise, not to forget to give you such an account of these reinforcements, as may be sufficient to open to you the absolute necessity of a large remittance from Great-Britain. And to this end, I need not be particular. It might be imprudent, under present circumstances, to be so : Though I may tell you, the General-Assembly of this province, who are now sitting, have, this week, acted the part of wise and kind fathers to this people in sending home a representation of what has been done, with reference to this affair ; and I cannot but hope, and believe, it will procure a removal of that heavy weight of charge that is now lying on us, and must sink us into ruin, if we don't receive support from our mother-country.

I shall therefore only say in general, that the reinforcements already gone, and now going to our army, will make it a very formidable one, I mean for this part of the world ; and the

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charge arising from the pay and subsistence, [almost doubled in its cost, by the difficulty of transportation] of such a body of men, must appear, to all who will allow themselves to think, to be far beyond the utmost ability of a few poor infant colonies, as the New-England ones certainly are. They are all engaged in the present expedition ; they will all therefore need assistance: tho' this is emphatically true of the Massachusetts-province: nor can it be denied, that they have the first and best claim [I would not say an exclusive one] to the pity and help of Great-Britain. They are the principals in the enterprize on foot, and bear the greatest part in it. But this is not all: the better half of each of the regiments raised, this spring, upon the establishment, under major-general Shirley, and major-general Pepperell, were inhabitants of the Massachusetts-Bay; and the other two regiments, which are gone to Nova-Scotia, were almost wholly made up of men of the same province. 'Tis true, these regiments are in the pay of the crown: but still, the benefit of the labour of so many men, in their proper business, is lost to the province; and further, the proportion of the tax that would have fallen to their share, must now be taken from them, and fastened upon the other members of the government; which, you are sensible, will greatly increase their burden. Besides, no longer ago than last year, we were at the expence of erecting a fort
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on the banks of Kennebeck-River, under the cover of 8 or 900 men raised for the purpose, principally with a view to secure our sovereign's rights in those parts; the expence of which fort, in its erection, and maintenance to this day, has amounted to two hundred thousand pounds, our money, at the lowest computation. Nor is this all yet: as we are at war, not only with the Indians near Canada, but with all the tribes of eastern Indians, (the Penobscots excepted, against whom also we are upon the point of proclaiming war) we are obliged to keep a considerable number of our men constantly scouring the woods from east to west, in a line of 2 or 3000 miles, to defend our out-settlements against their depredations. — In short, one sixth part of the effective men in the province are, at this day, in military-service; and more than double the number in our own pay, than when we went against Cape-Breton; and if the burden of that expedition was justly thought too heavy for us, much more is this the truth of the case at present. — We stand indeed a sad chance of being an undone people, if we are not pitied and relieved from the other side of the water. — 'Twill otherwise be certainly impossible for us to engage in any enterprise the next year. — We shall have neither a heart disposing us, nor money enabling us thereto: whereas, if we are reimbursed this charge, and properly assured, that any other attempts shall be carried

on at the expence of the crown, it will give a spring to our vigour, and we shall join heart and hand in exerting our whole power to promote the service of our king in scourging his and our enemies.

And if we are thus supplied with money, let the southern colonies sleep on *, while the New-England government are raising and sending large reinforcements in defence, even of those territories that are frontiers to them, and in the defence of which they especially should lay themselves out to the utmost: I say, if we of the Massachusetts-province, together with the other New-England colonies, are properly encouraged and strengthened with money from home, we shall nothing regard the strange conduct of the southern governments, but cheerfully and resolutely undertake any enterprize for the common good; and doubt not, but we

* The whole reinforcement of our army has been from the New-England colonies, who, to their honour be it spoken, have exerted themselves beyond what could have been expected. It is plain, from the spirit and conduct our southern brethren have discovered, that if any thing is done to purpose against the French, it must be done by New-England. And shall they not be assisted, in point of money, from Great-Britain?—Can it, in the name of reason, be thought equal, that these colonies should be diminished and impoverished, while the growth of the southern ones, in number and riches, is hereby promoted?—From the character we have of governor Hardy, and the spirit he has already discovered, we hope New-York, under his administration, will act more like friends to the common British interest.

shall soon be able, without any assistance from them, under the smiles of Providence, to bring down the pride of the American-French, and make them glad to be at peace with us upon any terms.

Wishing soon to hear good tidings from our brethren, who, by this time, we would hope, are gone from Lake-George, properly reinforced, in further prosecution of their design,

I am, with great respect,

Your affectionate friend,

and humble servant,

Boston, September

29, 1755.

T. W.

P. S. The Indians have all left our camp; tho' not thro' disgust, but in compliance with a custom they have of going home after a battle, to rejoice and mourn, as there is occasion for both, or either. They passed thro' Albany with many scores of scalps, mostly French, fastened on poles, and carried along in solemn triumph; They seemed highly pleased also with the laced hats and cloaths, the guns, the watches, the pocket-money, and other plunder, our people were willing to let them have for their encouragement; and it very much added to their pleasure

pleasure to hear that governor Hardy had brought a noble present for them from his Britannick majesty. Their return is expected in about a fortnight, with a much greater number from their several tribes, when governor Hardy will, WITHOUT FRAUD, in person, in the name of his royal master, deliver the present to them: upon which they will rejoin our army. It is said, and I believe with truth, that they design to send to all the tribes of Indians in subjection to, and alliance with them, to sharpen their arrows, and come forth to revenge the death of their Sachem.—The fall of this Indian chief is a great loss to us, as well as them. For he was a fast friend to the English, as an inveterate hater of the French; having too much understanding not to see thro' the designs, which he was convinced would finally end, if accomplished, in the reduction of the Indians to a state of slavery. It was very much owing to his influence that the Six-Nations, notwithstanding the abuses they have suffered from some Yorkers, have been so firmly attached to our interest.—Perhaps, there is not left, among all the Indians on the continent, a man equal to him in policy; and he had the strength and courage of a lion.



T. W.

F I N I S.